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Many authorities at home and abroad questioned Italy’s ability to meet the strict criteria to
join the European Monetary Union. The author looks at the interaction between fiscal policy
and monetary policy in Italy between 1992, when it exited the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism, and 1998, when an official announcement was made that it would join the union.
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Truly independent monetary
policy is impossible if fiscal
deficits create expectations of
future government interference
in monetary affairs.
It is widely recognized that all episodes
of high inflation across the world were
accompanied by rapid money creation
on the part of a central bank. At the same
time, most of these episodes occurred in
countries that faced serious fiscal im-
balances.1 The central banks of these
countries caved in to the needs of the
fiscal authorities, because of either po-
litical or institutional constraints.
In this Chicago Fed Letter, I look at the in-
teraction between fiscal policy and mon-
etary policy in a somewhat different case,
one in which the central bank consistent-
ly experienced a high degree of indepen-
dence and no fiscal crisis occurred:
namely, Italy between September 1992,
when it exited the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM), and May 1998,
when an official announcement was
made that it would join the European
Monetary Union (EMU).2 While Italy’s
central bank was not actually forced to
run (and did not run) the printing press
to bankroll public deficits, I argue that
movements in the exchange rates and,
to some extent, inflation were dominated
by the people’s expectations about what
could have happened. These expecta-
tions were driven mainly by fiscal news.
During the run-up to the European
Monetary Union, uncertainty about Italy’s
ability to join exacerbated the swings in
expectations, which made the Italian
experience a somewhat extreme but
particularly informative case.
Fiscal and monetary conditions in
Italy after the ERM crisis
While Italy experienced moderately
high rates of inflation throughout the
1970s and the early 1980s (peaking at
around 21% in 1980), by 1992 inflation
had been stable at around 5% for many
years. The Bank of Italy had gradually
become more and more independent
from the executive branch over the pre-
vious decade. This trend toward greater
institutional independence started with
the widely acclaimed “divorce” in 1981,
whereby the bank was no longer forced
to act as a residual claimant of unsold
Italian Treasury debt securities. Aside
from gaining more institutional indepen-
dence, the Bank of Italy also enjoyed a
large degree of popularity and respect
from the public—a further benefit of
disinflation that reinforced its ability
to run an effective monetary policy.
Throughout the disinflation period, in-
dependence from the executive branch
was accompanied by tighter involve-
ment in the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism. Central banks participat-
ing in the ERM committed to keep their
currencies within a narrow band. While
the band was periodically readjusted,
participation in the quasi-fixed exchange
rate regime limited the freedom of the
central bank, and it was an important
element for the Bank of Italy in regaining
credibility for pursuing price stability


















markets. The Italian commitment to
the ERM was suspended in September
1992, following unprecedented specu-
lative attacks. This suspension was trig-
gered in part by domestic weaknesses
and in part by larger international
considerations. On the domestic front,
the ability to sustain a strong exchange
rate was challenged by the same fiscal
concerns about the ability to manage
debt that would play such an important
role in the subsequent years. From a
broader perspective, the ERM was par-
ticularly fragile in the wake of German
reunification: The British pound aban-
doned the system at the same time as
the Italian lira, and the following year
the trading bands for most currencies
were widened sixfold. Leaving the ERM
implied that, for the first time, the Bank
of Italy would have the responsibility of
conducting a truly independent mon-
etary policy, free from both internal
and external constraints.
The disinflation of the 1980s was not
matched by equal progress in public
finances. On the contrary, higher real
interest rates and the ceasing of seignior-
age revenues3 led to increasing deficits.
Government debt in 1992 stood at
over 100% of gross domestic product
(GDP) and continued to grow rapidly,
with interest payments imposing an
ever-increasing burden on the budget.
Even the very large fiscal adjustment
(almost 6% of GDP)
approved after the
shocking exit from the
ERM only managed
to slow the growth




The solution to the
Italian fiscal imbalance
could come from one
of three sources (or a
combination of them):
• An increase in taxes
and/or a decrease
in spending,
￿ A spurt of inflation,
and
￿ Outright repudiation (or a capital
levy).4
To gauge the extent of inflation and
default risk, one can see that yields on
Italian ten-year government bonds in the
last quarter of 1992 averaged 13.85%,
almost 9% above inflation. Several stud-
ies have looked at decomposing this risk
into the risk of devaluation/inflation
and outright credit default.5 These
studies found that the pure credit risk
of Italian sovereign debt was small, but
not insignificant, suggesting that finan-
cial markets viewed reversion to high
inflation (or a capital levy across a broad
spectrum of financial assets) as a more
likely outcome than repudiation. More
than simply providing seigniorage rev-
enues, inflation would act as an implicit
default on existing government debt,
since most of it was denominated in do-
mestic currency and was not indexed to
prices. The effectiveness of inflation was
somewhat limited by the short average
maturity of debt.6
The precarious state of Italian finances
posed two challenges for monetary policy.
￿ Expectations of future conditions are
an essential determinant of interest
rates, exchange rates, and eventually
the overall price level. The control
that the central bank could exert over
all these variables was limited, since
fiscal news challenged the belief that
the central bank would be able to retain
its political and institutional inde-
pendence in the long run.7 Figure 1
displays interest rates on one- and
ten-year government debt, along with
the official discount rate set by the Bank
of Italy; this figure clearly suggests that
movements in the official rate fol-
lowed, rather than led, the trend in in-
terest rates on government securities.
Figure 2 displays the exchange rate
of the lira against the deutsche mark
(the dominant currency in Europe at
the time) and inflation. During the
period, Italy experienced extreme
swings in its exchange rate, which the
Bank of Italy had very limited ability
to control. As an example, some of the
largest daily swings occurred between
March 15 and March 22, 1995, and co-
incided with parliamentary votes over
a supplementary budget resolution
and debates over pension reform. The
inflation response to currency swings
was significant, albeit surprisingly mut-
ed, compared with the magnitude of
devaluations and revaluations; this is
most likely due to the fact that a fiscal
adjustment and a consequent revalua-
tion of the lira took place before the
large depreciation of 1994–95 had
passed through into prices.
￿ Monetary authorities mostly adopt a
short-term rate as their policy instru-
ment. It is usually taken for granted
that this rate is risk free and that
movements in the rate (net of infla-
tion) reflect looser or tighter credit
conditions. As already noted, the re-
turn on Italian Treasury securities
reflected a small, but significant and
time-varying, credit risk: This made
it harder to disentangle changes in
interest rates stemming from the
perceived probability of default (or
capital levy) from changes purely
reflecting credit tightness.
A resolution
Eventually, uncertainty was resolved in
favor of a fiscal adjustment, and no de-
fault occurred. The success of this ma-
neuver, which took place in 1996, once
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2. Exchange rate and inflation in Italy, 1992–98
(rather than monetary) policy in deter-
mining interest rates and inflation over
this period. Throughout 1996, it became
increasingly clear that a strict adher-
ence to the limit of a 3% deficit-to-GDP
ratio in 1997 would be required of coun-
tries to be admitted to the European
Monetary Union. This limit and the
huge stock of debt put Italy squarely into
a region of multiple equilibria, where
the expectations of financial markets
would become self-fulfilling. If the public
or the markets expected Italy to join
the EMU, the resulting drop in interest
rates would bring enormous relief to
public finances and put the 3% within
easy reach. If instead the public or the
markets perceived Italy would remain
out of the union, the persistent inflation-
ary risk would keep interest rates at very
high levels and would make it all but im-
possible to bring the deficit down to the
required threshold. This situation was
very clear to the government.8 To steer
markets toward favorable expectations,
public officials throughout 1996 increas-
ingly stressed a commitment to the fiscal
discipline needed to enter the EMU, and
in the fall of 1996, a carefully crafted
fiscal package of spending cuts and tax
increases (including a one-time income
tax surcharge explicitly labeled “euro
tax”) was approved. The size of the fiscal
adjustment of 1996 was much smaller
than the one that was approved in the
wake of the 1992 crisis,
but it was just enough
(by skill or luck) to tip
the markets into believ-
ing that Italy would be
able to join the EMU.
Figure 1 shows the re-
sulting slide in inter-
est rates that ensured
that the 3% threshold
would be reached.
The resolution of the
fiscal uncertainty was
accompanied by a large
recovery in the foreign
value of the Italian lira
and by a drop of infla-




Thomas J. Sargent and Neil Wallace9
remarked that a truly independent
monetary policy is impossible if fiscal
deficits create expectations of future
government interference in monetary
affairs. Italy between 1992 and 1998
offers a clear example of Sargent and
Wallace’s “unpleasant monetarist
arithmetic.” More recently, the “fiscal
theory of the price level” has argued
that there are conditions under which
the evolution of prices is primarily dic-
tated by the need to match the real
value of debt to the primary surpluses
that the fiscal authorities are willing or
able to deliver,10 with monetary policy
playing a minor role at best. In other
work,11 I have argued that the fiscal
strategies that lead to the fiscal theory
of the price level are more natural in
an environment where the govern-
ment is running primary surpluses for
the foreseeable future, a condition
that highly indebted Italy faced at the
time. In the almost daily reaction of
exchange rates to fiscal news, it is
tempting to see the fiscal theory at
work. At the same time, fiscal policy
was so important because of its reper-
cussions for Italy’s likelihood of join-
ing the EMU or staying out of it; this
created a very unusual direct link
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